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patentability. 11 9
VI.

CONCLUSION

Like earlier Supreme Court decisions, Diehr says neither yea nor
nay to the underlying question of whether computer programs are
patentable. Unlike previous decisions, Diehr leans in favor of patentability. Diehr establishes a new test for determining patentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 which is much broader and
more liberal than previous Court approved tests. Although the
Court did not overrule Parker v. Flook, Diehr torpedoes Flook's
rationale, thereby leaving Flook afloat but dead in the water, a derelict trap for the unwary. Under Diehr the key to whether a computer program related patent application defines patentable subject matter appears to reside in the skill and competency of the
draftsman. If the application recites a process larger than the program itself, then the application will define patentable subject
matter regardless of old or obvious aspects of the process recited.
PAUL D. JEss

Taxation-DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY-PARTNERS UNABLE TO IGNORE EXISTENCE OF CORPORATION USED FOR FINANCING

PuRosEs--Ogiony v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Ogionys joined a group of investors intending to develop
rental apartment projects in Cheektowaga, New York.1 In 1966, the
investors formed Garden Village Partnership (Garden Partnership)
for the purpose of constructing the apartment complex, Garden
Village. 2 Three years later, the building of another apartment complex, Losson Gardens, was begun through a newly organized partnership, Losson Gardens Company (Losson Partnership).' Financing of the projects proved difficult. Because the market interest
rate for nonresidential mortgages exceeded the maximum rate that
119.

See Gemignani, supra note 1, at 301-04.

1. Ogiony v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 125,126, afld, 617 F.2d 14, 80-1 U.S.T.C.
9265 (2d Cir. 1980). The group of investors comprised other individuals besides the
Ogionys. Their individual claims were consolidated in trial. 38 T.C.M. at 125, n.1.
2. Id. at 126.
3. Id. at 130.
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could be imposed on individual borrowers under the usury laws of
New York,' the partners individually could not obtain adequate
financing at the time construction was to begin.' Recognizing the
dilemma faced by the partners, the lender suggested a corporation
be used as a financing vehicle in order to qualify for the corporate
borrower exemption to the usury laws."
Accordingly, Garden Village Builders, Inc. (Garden Corporation), an inactive corporation previously created by one of the7
partners, was used as the financing vehicle for Garden Village.
Similarly, in 1969, Losson Corporation was specially formed in order to procure construction financing for Losson Gardens.8 In order to qualify as the mortgagors of record, the partnerships in both
cases conveyed to the corporations title to the property held for
development.' Each corporation retained title of its respective
property throughout most of the construction period.' 0
Reflecting the corporations' status as financing vehicles, all
draws on the construction loans were transferred by the corporations to the partnerships." Moreover, rentals earned on completed
apartments were deposited to the partnerships' accounts. Further4. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 126; 617 F.2d at 15, 80-1 U.S.T.C.
9265 at 83,523.
5. 617 F.2d at 15, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9265 at 83,523. See generally N.Y. General Obligations Law § 5-521 (McKinney 1978).
6. 617 F.2d at 16, 80-1 U.S.T.C. V 9265 at 83,523.
Garden Corporation was formed by P. Santin and A. Stangl in 1965. In 1966, Roxborough
Homes Corp., in which the Ogionys were the principal shareholders and officers, acquired a
one-third interest in Garden Corporation. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 126.
The partnership of "P. Santin, J. & E. Ogiony, A. Stangl-Joint Venture" (Garden Partnership) was also formed in 1966. Id. The partners conveyed their interest in the property
under consideration to Garden Corporation merely for financing purposes. Id. at 128.
Losson Gardens Co. (Losson Partnership) was a joint venture involving P. Santin Construction Co., Inc., Roxborough Homes Corp. and J. & J. Nasca. These partners organized
Losson Corporation in 1969 "solely to satisfy bank requirements for obtaining a loan." Id. at
130.
7. 617 F.2d at 16, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9265 at 83,523, n.3. Garden Corporation agreed to
finance the construction of Garden Village on the condition that the property to be used in
the project be conveyed to the corporation solely for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage on
the project. Garden Corporation agreed to reconvey the project, encumbered with a permanent mortgage, to Garden Partnership upon receipt of the final draw on the construction
mortgage. 38 T.C.M. at 127. "[O]n two occasions Garden Corporation transferred title ...
back to the Partners." Id. at 127-28. Losson Partnership conveyed land to Losson Corporation so that the corporation could execute a mortgage on the project. Id. at 130. Losson
Corporation retained title. Id. at 131.
8. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 130; 617 F.2d 16, n.3, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9265 at 83,523, n.3.
9. 617 F.2d at 16, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9265 at 83,523.
10. Id.
11. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 128, 131.
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more, the partnerships covered project expenses1 2 and Garden
Partnership was listed as the lessor in leasing agreements entered
into with tenants. 3
The partnerships reported both income and expense items relating to the apartment projects on their partnership information returns."' The partners then claimed their respective distributive
shares of the partnerships' reported operating losses on their individual federal tax returns.1" The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) disallowed the claimed loss deductions on the
ground that the losses were properly deductible only by the
corporations.1 6
The taxpayers petitioned the Tax Court, contending that the
corporations should have been ignored for tax purposes.1 7 The arguments advanced in support of their position were that Strong v.
Commissioner,8 a case relied upon by the Commissioner, had been
wrongly decided; 19 that the corporations were in fact agents or
nominees of the partnerships; and that the partners were entitled
to claim their respective shares of the net operating losses because
revenues and expenses generated by the projects were received and
paid by the partnerships rather than the corporations.2 0 The Commissioner argued in opposition that Strong had been correctly decided and should be followed because of similarities between the
two cases.2 1 Thus, the corporations would be recognized as owners
of the property conveyed to them and consequently entitled to
22
claim the loss deductions.
The Tax Court held for the Commissioner. s It refused to reap12. Id.
13. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 128.
14. Id. at 131. Garden Corporation reported no income but it claimed deductions for
expenses. Id. at 130.
15. 617 F.2d at 16, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9265 at 83,523. With regards to Garden Partnership,
the claims were made for 1967 through 1971. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 130. The Losson Partnership loss claim was made in 1971. Id. at 131.
16. 617 F.2d at 16, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9265 at 83,523.
17. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 131. For purposes of trial and opinion, the claims of the individual partners were consolidated. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 125, n.1.
18. 66 T.C. 12 (1976), aff'd without published opinion, 553 F.2d 94, 77-1 U.S.T.C. 9240
(2d Cir. 1977).
19. See generally Kurtz & Kopp, Taxability of Straw Corporations in Real Estate
Transactions,22 TAx LAw. 647 (1969) and Kronovet, Straw Corporations:When Will They
be Recognized; What Can and Should be Done, 39 J. TAx. 54 (1973).
20. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 132.
21. See text accompanying note 68 infra.
22. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 131.
23. Id. at 132-33.
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praise the Strong rationale, stating simply that "Strong is a reviewed opinion which was approved without dissent."'' 4 The court
adopted the position that the partners would be unable to "evade
the tax consequences" of employing corporations simply by characterizing them as their agents when they had economically benefited
from their use. The corporations' alternate characterization as
nominees was also rejected under authority of Strong.25 The court
dispensed with the taxpayer's last argument by concluding that
any excess out-of-pocket payments made on behalf of the projects

by the partnerships were not to be treated as losses but rather as a
"contribution to the capital of the corporations.""'

On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed after determining that
Strong applied. 27 In a concise opinion, the court held that "'in-

come from property must be taxed to the corporate owner,"' unless the corporation served merely as a "passive dummy" or was
used solely to avoid taxation." With little discussion, these exceptions were found inapplicable to the taxpayers.' 9
24.
25.

Id. at 132.
Id.

26.

Id.

27. 617 F.2d 14, 16, 17, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9265 at 83,523-24 (1980). The court affirmed the
Tax Court decision except with respect to certain calculations relating to allowed deductions. Those parts of the decision relating to these deductions were remanded so the Tax
Court could amend its calculations. Id. at 17. The error related to a mistake made in calculating "Garden Partnership's share of the interest on the purchase obligation paid in 1967 to
Sereth Properties, Inc., the seller of the real estate on which" Garden Village was built. The
appropriate deduction was $4,520.82 instead of the $2,728.42 figure computed by the Tax
Court. Id.
28. Id. at 16, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9265 at 83,523 (quoting Strong, 66 T.C. at 22).
29. Id. at 16, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9265 at 83,523. The court also addressed other arguments
raised by the taxpayer. In particular, the court rejected the taxpayer's assertion that the
Commissioner had acted capriciously and arbitrarily in applying section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code) (first raised in the Tax Court at 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 132). The court
simply noted that the record was devoid of any indication that the Commissioner had even
invoked section 482 with his statutory notices of deficiency. 617 F.2d at 16-17, 80-1 U.S.T.C.
9265 at 83,523-24. Section 482 authorizes the Commissioner to reallocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or other allowances of related taxpayers in order to more accurately
reflect income and avoid the distortion of tax liability. It is designed to apply to artificial
transactions which distort income. Tress. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (1980).
The taxpayers also asserted they were entitled to rely on private letter rulings issued
other taxpayers and covering scenarios similar to the one at bar in the Tax Court. 38 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 133. The Tax Court summarily dismissed that contention and stated that it was
well settled law that private letter rulings have no precedential value. Id. Judge Oakes, in
his concurring opinion, was the only member of the court on appeal to address this issue.
617 F.2d at 17, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9265 at 83,524. Recognizing the merit of the taxpayer's
argument, he suggested that private letter rulings did indeed possess precedential value.Judge Oakes relied on Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672 (1962), and stated that
the Commissioner would be well-advised to consistently and uniformly treat taxpayers simi-
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To fully appreciate Ogiony v. Commissioner,30 the evolution of
this field of the tax law must be investigated. In light of recent
developments and especially with the unquestioned adoption of
Strong, Ogiony falls within the natural progression of cases following the landmark decision rendered in Moline Properties,Inc. v.
Comamissionersl Whether this progression is justified and desirable
is another question entirely.
Prior to 1943, the year in which the Supreme Court decided Moline, the courts generally recognized that a corporation might be
employed for reasons devoid of tax considerations.3 2 Taxpayers frequently utilized corporations for a number of reasons; among these
is a desire to escape mortgage liability, to enjoy anonymous ownership, to limit tort and contract liability, to escape disruption of
management in case of premature death or withdrawal of a partner
or owner, to simplify conveyancing, to avoid personal liability, to
gain advantage under the law of the state of incorporation, or to
increase the taxpayer's borrowing capacity. 33 Historically, the beneficial owner in these arrangements-the taxpayer-sought to disregard the corporation's separate existence by arguing its activities
were insufficient to give it a separate taxable identity.3 4 The effect
of this argument would be to treat the taxpayer as the sole owner
of a project even though a corporation had been used in one or
more transactions during the construction period.3
larly situated. 617 F.2d at 17-18, 80-1 U.S.T.C. T 9265 at 83,524-25. Nevertheless, such incitefulness did not help the taxpayers since Judge Oakes found that they had not established sufficient doubt concerning the Commissioner's action in order to trigger further
judicial scrutiny. 617 F.2d at 18, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9265 at 83,525.
The Tax Court concluded that the Strong decision controlled. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 132.
The Second Circuit agreed and cited Judge Hall of the Tax Court who noted "that the
instant case is virtually indistinguishable from Strong," 617 F.2d at 16, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9265
at 83,523.
30. 617 F.2d at 14, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9265 (1980).
31. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
32. See Baker & Rothman, Nominee and Agency Corporations:Graspingfor Straws, 33

N.Y.U.

INST. ON FED. TAX.

1255, 1262-63 (1975).

33. See generally, Baker & Rothman, supra note 32, at 1257-63; Hoffman, Straw br
Nominee Corps. Must be as Passive as Possible to Protect Investors Deductions, 5 TAX FOR
LAW. 10 (1976); Kronovet, supra note 19, at 54; Palcar Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 131
F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1942); Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 220 (10th
Cir. 1942); Watson v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1942); Sheldon Bldg. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 118 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1941); Bond v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 478 (1950).

34. 6

FED. TAX COORDINATOR 2D

D-1200 at 18,028 (1980). Normally, it is the Internal

Revenue Service which seeks to ignore the corporation in order to impose a higher tax rate
on a shareholder's income.
35. See Stogel & Jones, Straw and Nominee Corporations in Real Estate Tax Shelter
Transactions, 1976 WASH. UNIv. L. Q. 403, 406. Internal Revenue Code, section 761(a), de-
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On the other hand, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) promoted the corporation's separate taxable identity. By successfully
emphasizing the active role played by the corporation during the
construction of the project, several significant tax consequences befell the taxpayer. The taxpayer's income might increase due to a
reallocation of a claimed loss to the corporation, and any corp 6 rate
distributions might be recharacterized as "dividend income, return
of capital or gain from the sale or exchange of property." 6 Thus,
the stakes being high, the battle could be fierce.
In recent times, however, the taxpayer has frequently lost the
battle. With the exception of subchapter-S elections, 3 the taxpayer is rarely extended the privilege to freely disregard his corporation's existence at his convenience.38 This restraint is predicated
upon recognition of the corporation as a separate jural personality
or entity

9

in order to protect the integrity of the corporate income

tax.40
fines a partnership as including "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on." Section 761(b) defines the partner as a member of the partnership. See
also I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3), which defines a corporation to include "associations, joint-stock
companies, and insurance companies."
Because of the Code's broad definition of a corporation, the courts have applied six corporate characteristics when distinguishing a corporate entity from other entities. Although not
exclusive, the characteristics are: (1) the presence of associates; (2) a purpose to carry on
business and divide gain; (3) continuity of life; (4) centralized management; (5) limited liability; and (6) the free transferability of interests. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)-(e) (1980).
Normally each partner in a partnership is required to report his distributive share of the
partnership income or loss. For a more complete discussion of partnership income and the
partner's distributive share, see Cowan, Partnerships- Taxable Income and Distributive
Shares, 282 TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS (Silverstein ed. 1978); Spada, Partnerships-Statutory Outline and Definition, 161-2nd TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS, (Silverstein ed. 1978).
36. See supra note 35, at 405.
37. An election to become a sub-chapter S corporation may effectively destroy a nominee
status argument. See Howell v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 546 (1972); Hooper v. Commissioner,
33 T.C.M. (CCH) 759 (1974). There may also be problems relating to the code section 1372
(e)(5) restriction with regard to passive investment income. For a discussion of sub-chapter
S elections as an alternative to conduit corporations, see Baker & Rothman, supra note 32,
at 1310.
38. See United States v. Rexach, 185 F.Supp. 465 (Dist. Ct. P.R. 1960); Strong v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 12 (1976), aff'd without published opinion, 553 F.2d 94, 77-1 U.S.T.C. 1
9240 (2d Cir. 1977). See I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379 (1980). See generally Kinzer & Marzehi, SubChapter S Operations 60-6th TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS, (Silverstein ed. 1980); 7 MERTEN'S LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX. §§ 41B.01-41B.44 (1976).
39. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), in which the Court recognized
congressional power to tax corporations as separate entities.

40. See Carver v. United States, 412 F.2d 233 (Ct. Cl. 1969). See also Judge Tannewald's
comments on the two tier tax structure in the Strong opinion which reflects the fear that
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Nevertheless, with regard to cases in which a corporation held
title to property for the convenience of the beneficial owner, early
decisions rendered before Moline favored imposing the tax burden
on the beneficiary. Relying on an equitable ownership theory, the
courts inquired into the extent to which the owner benefited from
the property and to what degree control was exercised over the
property taxed. 41 The judiciary's attention was not directed as
much at "refinements of title" as it was at benefit and control. "2
Because benefit and control were the determinative factors, arrangements could be planned whereby control was exercised
through a legal interest as long as real authority and benefit remained with the taxpayer.43 As a result, the corporation was frequently disregarded, and the beneficial owner was recognized as
the real party in interest. The practical consequence of this state of
affairs was that any income or loss could be attributed to a shareholder-owner when the corporation could, with minimal independent activity, hold title to property for the convenience of that
shareholder-owner." Unfortunately, no clear definitional standard
was provided under this approach. Consequently, the question remained: To what extent would corporate activity satisfying the
taxpayer's business objectives contemporaneously qualify as minimal independent activity for tax purposes?
Addressing this uncertainty, the Supreme Court in Moline formulated a disjunctive test. 45 In that case, a corporation was em-

ployed as a security device for additional financing with respect to
Florida realty. Title to the property was in the corporation's name.
The corporation's qualifying shares were transferred to a trustee
appointed by the creditor. Upon repayment of the loan, the shares
were returned to the taxpayer and sole shareholder of the corporation. The corporation subsequently leased and sold some real estate, and its sole shareholder reported the sales on his individual
lenient disregard of corporate entities may encourage taxpayers to employ a corporation
merely to avoid the higher tax rates applicable to their personal income. Hence, a taxpayer
in a high tax bracket could conceivably benefit from such an arrangement. Problems of
double taxation with regard to dividend income among other problems with such an arrangement might dissuade taxpayers from following such a scheme "en masse." 66 T.C. at
12, 24 (1976).
41. See United States v. Brager Bldg. & Land Corp., 124 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1941).
See also Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376
(1930).
42. 124 F.2d at 351-52.
43. Id. at 352.
44. Id. at 351; North Jersey Title Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 898 (3rd Cir. 1936).
45. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

406

[Vol. 9:399

returns."6 The question addressed by the Court concerned who
should be taxed on the sales.41
The Supreme Court held the corporation to be the appropriate
taxpayer and recognized it as a viable separate taxable entity." In
an attempt to define the scope of the relevant inquiry more precisely, the Court espoused the view that:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business
life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law
of the state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the
demands of creditors or to serve the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by
the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable
entity.4 '
The disjunctive test thus laid down by the Court assessed the
extent to which the corporation's purpose "is the equivalent of
business activity" or "is followed by the carrying on of business."
Although prior to Moline courts tended to focus on the actual significance of the benefit to the beneficiary,50 the Supreme Court
nevertheless dispensed with any requirement that in order to qualify as a taxable entity the corporation retain beneficial as well as
legal ownership of property. Under its new test, corporate retention merely of legal title could be sufficient to warrant recognition
of the corporation's existence." The purpose achieved by the corporation's creation and the degree of business activity engaged in
therefore became relevant inquiries under the two alternate prongs
of the Moline test. Unfortunately, the Court did not specify what
business activity or the quantum of activity necessary to satisfy
the second prong of the test. The practical consequence of this failure was to leave it to other courts to decide what activity would
qualify under the test.
Later court decisions have played a critical role in refining how
the test is to be applied. Generally, the courts have emphasized the
second prong of the disjunctive test; i.e., the extent of business ac46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
(1975).
51.

Id. at 437-38.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 438-40.
Id. at 438-39 (footnotes omitted).
See Bertane, Tax Problems of the Straw Corporation,20 VILLA. L. REV. 735, 741,
Id. at 742.
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tivity." Hence, cases construing the Moline decision have interpreted the test to mean that "a corporation must engage in commercial, industrial, or some other activity besides tax-avoidance to
retain its corporate identity. ' '18 The level of activity required is not
great. Where a corporation was required to join in the execution of

all commercial and financial documents relating to the enterprise,
the test was met." Even where the owner made all decisions regarding corporate actions, the corporation was still considered a vi-

able separate entity within the meaning of the test because the
corporation shared in expenses, disposed of income, entered man-

agement contracts, filed tax returns, and so forth.5 '
The refining process took a new turn in the early seventies. In
applying the Moline test, the Tax Court in Bolger v. Commis-

sioner's and Rogers v.Commissioner,57 and the Court of Claims in
Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States" emphasized the business purpose prong of the test, even though the Supreme Court in Moline laid down the test as a disjunctive one, and

subsequent decisions construing its application favored the second
prong." Nevertheless, decisions such as Bolger, Harrison,and Rogers focused on the reasons justifying the creation and activity of
the corporation.
Bolger involved the corporate acquisition of property subsequently leased and the securing of negotiable notes issued to an

institutional lender. The property was then conveyed to the shareholders subject to contractual encumbrances. These transactions
transpired within one day. The court determined the corporations
were taxable entities because their purpose was avoidance of state
52. Rogers v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1254, 1256 (1975).
53. National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1944). See Greer v.
Commissioner, 334 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1965); Strasburger v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 236 (6th
Cir. 1964); Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828, rehearing
denied, 375 U.S. 926 (1963); Given v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1956); Whitfield's Estate v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1951).
54. Britt v. United States, 431 F.2d 227, 230, 237 (5th Cir. 1970).
55. Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595 (1968). For further examples, see generally Bateman v. United States, 490 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1973); Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United
States, 397 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1975); Kessler v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 514
(1977); Gettler v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 442 (1975); Harbour Prop., Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 580 (1973); Little Carnegie Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 29
T.C.M. (CCH) 647 (1970).
56. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
57. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1254 (1975).
58. 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130, rehearing denied, 415 U.S.
952 (1973).
59. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1256.
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usury laws and because they engaged in business activity by leasing property, issuing notes, and executing mortgages.6 0
Shortly thereafter, the Court of Claims in Harrisonalso refused
to ignore the corporation's existence. 61 The court concluded the
corporation could not be disregarded because it performed several
business functions in fulfilling the purpose served by its formation.
Although the corporation existed solely for the convenience of
shareholders, directors, and officers, because it entered into leases,
granted right-of-ways, and sold property, the corporation would
not be disregarded."
In Rogers, the Tax Court, in a memorandum decision, went further by characterizing the Moline test as a two-pronged test establishing alternative criteria. 3 Satisfaction of either alternative, business purpose or business activity, required recognition of the
corporation as a separate taxable entity.4 Although the court relied upon the business purpose prong in reaching its decision, it
also noted that the corporption had carried on enough business activity to satisfy the business activity prong of the test.6
The court's emphasis on purpose may explain the Tax Court's
adoption of an overly mechanical and simplistic analysis in Strong
v. Commissioner,6 a case very similar to Ogiony. In Strong, a corporation was also utilized to obtain mortgages for the construction
of an apartment complex.6 7 The taxpayers wanted to disregard the
corporation. They argued that it "was merely a sham or device
used for the purpose of avoiding the New York usury statute, that
it performed no acts other than those essential to that function,
and that to treat it as the actual owner of property would be to
exalt form over substance.""
The Tax Court was not persuaded by this argument. Reading
Moline narrowly, it concluded that the quantum of business activity required under the test was minimal and that avoidance of
state usury laws was a business purpose as contemplated under the
test.6 9
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

59 T.C. at 766-67.
475 F.2d at 627.
Id. at 629.
34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1256.
Id.
Id. at 1257.
66 T.C. at 12.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 24-26.
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The fact remains, however, that the corporation did exist and did
perform the function intended of it until the permanent loan was
consummated. It was more than a business convenience, it was a
business necessity to . . . [the taxpayer's] . . . enterprise. As
such, it came into being. As such, it'served the purpose of its
70
creation.
Prodded by the one-dimensional concept enumerated in
Bolger, Harrison,and Rogers, and cognizant of the practical difficulties inherent in differentiating between a dummy corporation
and a viable separate tax entity, the court in Strong directed its
attention to the taxpayer's motives underlying the creation of the
71
corporation.
A legitimate concern that the court read Moline too narrowly
arises. There is an obvious lack of reason and justice in a rule
which recognizes a corporation existing in form only and bases significant substantive results thereon. The decision may simply reveal an overriding concern that liberal judicial disposition will lead
to intolerable abuses of the tax system. In order to avoid this situation, the Strong court sought to withhold invoking the activity
prong of the test by focusing on the purpose for which the corporation was formed and used.
More ominous perhaps, in ruling against the taxpayer the court
espoused that "income from property must be taxed to the corporate owner."'7' Has the court created a presumption of sorts
whereby the corporation holding title to property is charged with
any income derived from the property regardless of the results of
an inquiry into purpose or activity? This would be a bold leap indeed in light of earlier interpretations attributed to the Supreme
Court's holding in Moline. Prior to Rogers and Strong, at least, the
Moline dual concern with purpose and activity flavored the more
mechanical inquiry which is evolving. Although both extremes
might be advocated-some arguing that a corporation's existence
should be taken as conclusive proof of its separate existence as a
tax entity, and others saying that a corporation's mere existence
should mean nothing absent relevant, compelling proof to the contrary-neither extreme should prevail. Rather, a sound formula of
70. Id. at 26 (quoting Collins v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 17, 21 (S.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd
per curiam, 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975)).
71. The Strong court focused on the purpose for which a corporation was used. It related
the corporation's existence to some taxpayer motivation to accomplish either a tax or nontax aim. Id. at 24.
72. Id. at 22.
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compromise should exist whereby facts and circumstances are explored in order to ascertain the true state of affairs existing between the corporation and those seeking to have it disregarded. Arguably, this formula received authoritative expression in Moline.
But, Strong adopts a purely mechanical orientation which systematically favors the mere existence of the corporation as the dispositive factor-in effect form triumphs over substance.
Before considering Ogiony more fully, the simultaneous development of another aspect of the problem should be addressed. The
Moline court explicitly recognized an agency perspective to the
problem. The leading case of National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner" provided the Supreme Court with the first opportunity after Moline to consider a case firmly grounded on an agency theory.
In National Carbide, the parent company had entered into an
agreement with three of its subsidiaries whereby it agreed to provide certain assets to the subsidiaries and give managerial and
financial help in return for all subsidiary profits exceeding a stated
amount.7 The Supreme Court held that the subsidiaries were corporate entities in their own right and rejected the parent com75
pany's assertion that an agency relationship existed.
The Court noted, however, the following:
What we have said does not foreclose a full corporate agent or
trustee from handling the property and income of its owner-principal without being taxable therefor ....
If the corporation is a
true agent, its relations with its principal must not be dependent
upon the fact that it is owned by the principal, if such is the case.
Its business purpose must be the carrying on of the normal duties
7
of an agent. 1
In considering what are the normal duties of an agent, the Court
listed a number of factors: (1) the agent operate in the name and
for the account of the principal; (2) the principal be bound by the
agent's acts; (3) the agent transmit any money received to the
principal; and (4) the receipt of income be attributable to the services of employees of the principal and to the assets belonging to
the principal.7
Compliance with these factors is crucial since the Service and
73.
74.
75.

336 U.S. 422 (1949).
Id. at 425.
Id. at 437-38.

76.
77.

Id.
Id.
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the courts have required convincing proof that an agency relation7
ship in fact exists before a corporation's existence will be ignored. 8
Inferences will not be made solely because a single shareholder
owns the corporation. 7 ' Simply put, National Carbide has been interpreted in subsequent cases to require that the corporation must
perform the duties of an agent.8 0
The Service's predisposition with respect to an agency argument
is disclosed in two private letter rulings. In these the Service insists that the agency-principal relationship must be the result of an
arms-length agreement. 1 In Harrison Property Management Co.
v. United States, the Court of Claims stated the determining criteria for this relationship is "whether the so-called 'agent' would
have made the agreement if the so-called 'principals' were not its
owners, and conversely whether the 'principals' would have undertaken the arrangement if the 'agent' were not their corporate creature." 8 However, the Bolger court rejected an agency argument relying on the same factors used to deny the taxpayer's assertion
that the corporations involved in the case had no separate taxable
identity.8" This merely reflects the Supreme Court's observation in
Moline that "the question of agency. .. depends upon the same
legal issues as does the question of [separate corporate] identity
Keeping this in mind, the Service's approach creates great difficulty for the taxpayer trying to argue an agency exception to the
general rule of corporate recognition. Normally, the taxpayer must
be able to point to an agency agreement and prove that the agency
is entered into as a result of arms-length negotiations.'8 This may
be difficult when the agent-corporation is owned by the principal
sole shareholder since "there are few meaningful criteria available
for determining the capacity in which the corporation really is acting." 86 Nevertheless, there are safeguards which have proved bene78. See Factor v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960); Van Heusden v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 491 (1965); Skarda v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 137 (1956), afl'd, 250 F.2d 429
(10th Cir. 1957).
79. See generally Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 566 (1966).
80. See generally Spermacet Whaling & Shipping Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 618
(1958), aff'd, 281 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1960).
81. See Private Letter Rulings 7,911,004 and 7,912,007.
82. 475 F.2d 623, 627 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
83. 59 T.C. at 766.
84. 319 U.S. at 440-41.
85. 475 F.2d at 617-28.
86. See Kurtz & Kapp, supra note 20, at 655.
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ficial for the taxpayer; for instance: (1) defining the agency status
of the corporation and the interest of its shareholder as principals;
(2) avoiding the use of corporate owned assets to carry out agency
duties; (3) maintaining an agency contract and corporate records
disclosing the agency; (4) communicating the agency arrangement
to outsiders, and most importantly; (5) planning the agency as a
reasonable business arrangement that could be entered into after
arms-length bargaining.8 7 Absent these, the taxpayer's agency argument is likely to fall on deaf ears. Furthermore, in recalling the
Supreme Court's observation in Moline, presumably when the disjunctive test is satisfied the corporation cannot be the agent of its
sole shareholder. 88
Ogiony stands as a recent application of the Moline test and perpetuates the trend established by Strong. In Ogiony taxpayers
sought to have the corporations ignored because they were intended to function solely as financing vehicles. They neither performed any other function nor engaged in any business activity
apart from that required in order to obtain loans.89
The Tax Court grounded its decision both on Strong and Moline. It expressed the view that once a taxpayer obtains a benefit
from the corporate form the corporation cannot be ignored."
Adopting the Strong approach, the court concluded that where a
corporation serves some purpose it will be considered a separate
taxable entity. 1
Having determined that Strong applied, the Second Circuit held
that "'income from property must be taxed to the corporate owner.' "92 Neither of the exceptions enunciated in Strong, that the
corporation was a "dummy" or that it was used to avoid taxes,
were found to be present by the court.9
Both courts felt adoption of the Strong rationale sufficed to support their decisions. But even the Strong court summarily dismissed the "dummy" corporation argument, stating simply that
the taxpayer's argument "is not without some appeal, but we con' 94
clude that it should not be accepted.'
87.

See Watts, Tax Problems of Regard for the CorporateEntity, 20 N.Y.U. TWENrIrTH
867, 868 (1962).
See 59 T.C. at 766; 319 U.S. at 440.
38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 127, 130.
38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 132.
Id. at 131-32.
617 F.2d at 16, 80-1 U.S.T.C. 9265 at 83,523 (quoting Strong, 66 T.C. at 22).
Id.
66 T.C. at 21.
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88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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The court's limited analysis undoubtedly resulted from the Supreme Court's observations in Moline that a taxpayer, once having
elected the corporate form, could not ignore the disadvantages concomitant with such a decision.2 Hence, it may be inferred that the
mere existence of the corporation is the unarticulated criteria used
in decisions like Strong and Ogiony. However, analysis should relate not to the corporation's status but rather to the legal relationship between the corporation and the property under consideration.9e Where "the corporation's activity or ownership of property

is so transitory or so confused with those of affiliated persons as to
be without significance," the conclusion should be that the corporation, as a separate entity, does not have adequate dominion and
control over the property. The beneficial owner should be recognized as retaining the taxable interest and consequently any benefits or costs associated with such property ought to attach to him.
But the approach adopted by the Tax Court and the Second Circuit in Ogiony is dominated by an excessive concern for form in a
misguided belief that abuse of the tax system will be avoided. This
rationale fails to recognize the alternate scenario in which a
"dummy" corporation is employed to shield anticipated large revenues from higher individual tax rates. Centering attention on the
mere existence of a corporation will not therefore better protect
the federal revenues. Moline should be construed to require a
searching analysis of the facts to determine whether the true substance of the arrangement is different from its form or whether the
form reflects what actually happened. To do otherwise simply
opens the flood gate to schemes in which the true nature of a
transaction will be disguised by mere formalisms designed only to
alter tax liability. Ogiony is merely the latest decision unflinchingly employing the Strong approach which unnecessarily hampers
95. Id. at 26.
96. Watts, supra note 87, at 883-85. See also United States v. Brager Bldg. & Land
Corp., 124 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1941), in which the court said:
But it is going too far to say that if a taxpayer forms a corporation for his convenience, he is thereafter estopped from disclosing the true nature of the arrangement, whenever it is of advantage to the government to recognize only the corporate form . . . .In a number of these cases . . . under circumstances quite similar
to those found in the case at bar, it has been held that when a corporation has
been formed merely as an agency to hold title to real estate for the convenience of
the owner, and has served this purpose with little or no independent activity on
its part, the property and the income therefrom should be regarded as belonging
to the stockholder.
Id. at 351.
97. See Watts, supra note 87.
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the freedom with which the corporate entity may be employed to
further business goals.
An approach which highlights the legal niceties but ignores the
real economic and beneficial ramifications of an arrangement simply exalts form over substance. But, as the Strong court concluded,
although the taxpayer "took most precautions consistent with business exigency to [prevent separate taxation of the corporation]
. . . we simply hold that their goal was not attainable." ' In a footnote the court admits that "whether there are limits, albeit narrow,
within which taxpayers might successfully structure transactions of
the type involved herein is a question we do not decide." 99
After Ogiony, this observation may be prophetic, for it is reasonable to conclude that avoiding state usury laws through the use of
a corporation falls within the scope of the Moline test regardless of
the extent of corporate activity. The test, once concerned with
both purpose and independently taken corporate action, has been
narrowed to the point that most taxpayers are hard pressed to
prove no business purpose nor business activity whatsoever. In
light of the Supreme Court's refusal to review the decision of the
Second Circuit, the taxpayer is well-advised to be wary of the lure
that a corporate entity may have with respect to non-tax motives
since the tax consequences can be disastrous.1 00
VINCENT A. SABLE

98, 66 T.C. at 26.
99. Id. at 26, n.13. This view may simply betray the court's concern that leniency with
respect to schemes employing a corporation may eventually be used by imaginative taxpayers to abuse the tax system. The approach adopted by the courts, however, ignores the potential for abuse when excessive income and not loss is the prime concern on the taxpayer's
mind. He may simply create a paper corporation to shelter income from higher personal tax
rates. More than likely, substance would then indeed triumph over form and the corporation
would be viewed a mere sham! Indeed, as the court noted in Commissioner v. State-Adams
Corp., 283 F.2d 395, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961): "The Commissioner, to prevent unfair tax avoidance, has greater freedom and responsibility to disregard
the corporate entity than a taxpayer, who normally cannot be heard to complain that a
corporation which he has created and which has served his purpose well, is a sham."
100. Ogiony v. Commissioner, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (Oct. 14, 1980) (cert. denied). Hence, as
the rule stands, the corporation and not its creators, is entitled to claim losses when the
corporation is organized in order to skirt a state's usury laws.
For a brief discussion of American Bar Association activity in this field, see Baker &
Rothman, supra note 32, at 1297-98.

